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ABSTRACT	  
During	  campaigns,	  voters	  often	  learn	  that	  their	  party's	  candidate	  advocates	  policy	  positions	  that	  
conflict	  with	  their	  own	  attitudes.	  	  These	  cross-­‐pressured	  voters	  can	  either	  adjust	  their	  policy	  positions	  to	  
be	  consonant	  with	  their	  party's	  candidate	  or	  voting	  for	  others.	  	  I	  use	  monthly	  NES	  Panel	  Data	  from	  2008-­‐
2009	  to	  examine	  how	  voters'	  beliefs	  change	  about	  a	  specific	  policy:	  the	  redistribution	  of	  wealth	  through	  
progressive	   taxation	  during	   a	  presidential	   campaign.	   I	   test	   this	   by	   creating	   a	  Random	  Effects	  Ordered	  
Probit	  Panel	  regression	  model	  of	  ten	  monthly	  waves	  of	  survey	  data	  before	  the	  2008	  presidential	  election.	  	  
The	  study	  shows	  that	  over	  the	  campaign,	  voters'	  policy	  positions	  evolve	  on	  redistributive	  taxation	  policy;	  
voters	  adjust	  their	  prior	  policy	  cognitive	  dissonance	  to	  be	  in	  agreement	  with	  their	  candidate.	  	  The	  results	  
indicate	  that	   in	  the	  2008	  Presidential	  election,	  the	  electorate	  more	  often	  moved	  their	  policy	  beliefs	  to	  
be	  in	  agreement	  with	  their	  candidate,	  rather	  than	  switch	  votes.	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During	  campaigns,	  voters	  often	  find	  their	  party's	  candidate	  advocates	  policy	  positions	  that	  con-­‐
flict	  with	  their	  own	  attitudes.	  These	  cross-­‐pressured	  voters	  can	  either	  adjust	  their	  policy	  positions	  to	  be	  
consonant	  with	  their	  party's	  candidate	  or	  switch	  votes	  to	  the	  other	  candidate.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  under-­‐
stand	  how	  cross-­‐pressured	  voters	  decide.	  	  In	  the	  traditional	  view,	  voting	  is	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  funnel	  of	  cau-­‐
sality	  (Campbell	  et	  al	  1960).	  	  Voters'	  policy	  positions	  are	  thought	  to	  be	  causally	  prior	  to	  vote	  choice,	  and	  
policy	  positions	  are	  thought	  to	  be	  largely	  pre-­‐decided	  by	  the	  demographics	  and	  material	  interest	  (see	  
Jackson	  1975).	  This	  theory	  has	  guided	  political	  science	  for	  five	  decades	  and	  is	  generally	  the	  way	  most	  
political	  analysts	  conceive	  of	  how	  vote	  choice	  occurs:	  policy	  beliefs	  lead	  to	  a	  particular	  ideology,	  ideolo-­‐
gy	  leads	  to	  a	  choice	  on	  party	  identification	  and	  finally,	  party	  identification	  leads	  to	  a	  vote	  choice.	  
It	  may	  be,	  however,	  that	  voters	  learn	  their	  candidates'	  policy	  preferences	  during	  the	  campaign,	  
and	  adjust	  their	  policy	  preferences	  to	  match	  their	  candidate.	  	  	  Lenz	  (2009)	  finds	  that	  campaigns	  and	  
mass	  media	  facilitate	  a	  process	  of	  learning,	  especially	  for	  people	  not	  well-­‐informed:	  voters	  are	  respon-­‐
sive	  to	  campaign	  messages.	  	  Issues	  that	  are	  discussed	  more	  thoroughly	  in	  the	  campaign	  are	  perceived	  
more	  precisely	  by	  the	  electorate	  (Lodge,	  Steenbergen	  and	  Brau	  1995).	  And	  we	  know	  that	  voters	  pay	  in-­‐
creasing	  attention	  to	  politics	  during	  presidential	  campaigns.	  	  	  Campaign	  mobilization	  provide	  easy	  to	  
obtain	  cues	  on	  how	  to	  think	  about	  political	  issues	  that	  cross-­‐pressured	  voters	  can	  pick	  up	  on	  (Rosen-­‐
stone	  and	  Hansen	  1993).	  	  If	  people	  like	  either	  Obama	  or	  McCain,	  they	  may	  listen	  to	  his	  speeches,	  watch	  
the	  presidential	  debates	  and	  political	  ads.	  	  Voters	  learn	  their	  preferred	  candidate's	  positions	  differ	  from	  
their	  own,	  for	  example,	  on	  tax	  policies.	  Thus,	  they	  make	  adjustment	  to	  reduce	  cognitive	  dissonance	  or	  
simply	  be	  persuaded	  by	  the	  candidate's	  argument.	  	  That's	  how	  one's	  policy	  beliefs	  change	  to	  agree	  with	  
the	  supported	  candidate's	  opinion.	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To	  test	  this	  possibility,	  I	  use	  monthly	  NES	  Panel	  Data	  from	  2008-­‐2009	  to	  examine	  how	  voters'	  
policy	  beliefs	  change	  about	  the	  redistribution	  of	  wealth	  through	  progressive	  taxation	  during	  2008	  presi-­‐
dential	  campaign.	  I	  test	  this	  by	  creating	  a	  Random	  Effects	  Ordered	  Probit	  Panel	  regression	  model	  of	  ten	  
monthly	  waves	  of	  survey	  data	  before	  the	  2008	  presidential	  election.	  I	  show	  that	  over	  the	  campaign,	  vot-­‐
ers'	  policy	  positions	  evolve	  on	  redistributive	  taxation	  policy.	  	  My	  findings	  show	  voters	  adjust	  their	  prior	  
policy	  dissonance	  to	  be	  in	  agreement	  with	  their	  candidate.	  The	  results	  indicate	  that	  in	  the	  2008	  Presi-­‐
dential	  election,	  cross-­‐pressured	  voters	  more	  often	  move	  their	  tax	  policy	  beliefs	  to	  be	  in	  agreement	  with	  
their	  candidate,	  rather	  than	  switch	  votes.	  	  
1. Rethinking	  the	  Funnel	  of	  Causality	  
Conventional	  wisdom	  believes	  that	  the	  issue	  orientations	  of	  an	  electorate	  derive	  from	  core	  values	  
(Alvarez	  and	  Brehm	  2002).	  	  Most	  Americans	  have	  stable	  underlying	  attitudes	  (Achen	  1975;	  Erikson	  1979,	  
1983;	  Feldman	  1990;	  Kinder	  and	  Sears	  1985;	  Page	  and	  Shapiro	  1992).	  	  General	  beliefs,	  for	  example,	  on	  
equal	  opportunity,	  self-­‐reliance,	  and	  limited	  government,	  enable	  principled	  reasoning	  on	  policy	  (Goren	  
2004).	  	  This	  issue	  orientation	  theory	  posits	  policy	  preferences	  are	  predominant	  in	  deciding	  electoral	  
choice	  (Page	  and	  Jones	  1979).	  	  People	  have	  policy	  stands	  first,	  then	  look	  for	  an	  endorsing	  political	  party	  
and	  candidate	  (Campbell	  et	  al	  1980).	  	  This	  funnel	  theory	  of	  voting	  has	  been	  widely	  accepted	  by	  scholar-­‐
ship	  for	  decades.	  	  	  	  	  
Page	  and	  Jones	  (1979)	  maintain	  policy	  stands	  lead	  to	  a	  choice	  on	  party	  affiliation.	  	  And	  party	  
identification	  is	  a	  useful	  cue	  in	  electoral	  decision-­‐making	  (Sniderman,	  Brody,	  and	  Tetlock	  1991).	  	  	  Parti-­‐
sans	  without	  encyclopedic	  policy	  information,	  would	  by	  default	  assume	  their	  party	  sympathize	  with	  
their	  policy	  stands	  and	  represent	  their	  benefits	  (Page	  and	  Brody	  1972).	  	  Party	  shortcuts	  even	  outweigh	  
policy	  reasoning	  and	  core	  political	  values	  in	  the	  cognitive	  process	  (Schaffner,	  Streb,	  and	  Wright	  2001;	  
Cohen	  2003,	  2005).	  	  	  People	  are	  still	  largely	  affected	  by	  party	  cues,	  despite	  a	  handsome	  amount	  of	  in-­‐
formation	  at	  hand	  (Bullock	  2011).	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Partisanship,	  once	  formed,	  is	  stable	  and	  largely	  defines	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  policy	  stands	  (Bartels	  
2002).	  	  People	  usually	  socialize	  with	  like-­‐minded	  cohorts,	  adopt	  information	  similar	  to	  their	  existing	  
opinion,	  and	  ignore	  conflicting	  messages	  (Huckfeldt	  et	  al	  2004;	  Mutz	  2006).	  	  	  Also,	  people	  are	  prone	  to	  
interpret	  new	  messages	  in	  the	  way	  that	  is	  congruent	  with	  their	  established	  views	  (Taber	  and	  Lodge	  
2006).	  	  Presented	  with	  negative	  messages	  about	  their	  supported	  candidate,	  voters	  might	  instead	  
strengthen	  their	  support	  for	  the	  candidate	  (Redlawsk	  2002).	  	  This	  backlash	  effect	  from	  partisan	  bias	  
therefore	  reinforces	  the	  divergence	  of	  existing	  ideological	  differences	  (Bartels	  2000;	  Nyhan	  and	  Reifler	  
2010).	  
The	  debate	  is	  basically	  a	  question	  over	  the	  causal	  relationship	  between	  voters'	  policy	  attitude	  
change	  and	  their	  electoral	  choice.	  The	  voting	  mechanism	  can	  be	  a	  simultaneous	  interaction	  between	  
party	  evaluation,	  political	  ideology	  and	  policy	  assessment,	  rather	  than	  a	  one-­‐way	  funnel	  (Brody	  and	  
Page	  1973;	  Jackson	  1975;	  Markus	  and	  Converse	  1979).	  	  Finkel	  (1995)	  proposes	  two	  paths	  for	  opinion	  
change:	  “Learning	  effects”	  echoes	  the	  views	  of	  The	  American	  Voter	  that	  voters'	  issue	  attitudes	  lead	  to	  
their	  vote	  choices;	  “Learning	  induced,	  issue	  opinion	  change”	  is	  where	  voters	  listen	  their	  candidate's	  
opinion,	  and	  eventually	  take	  it	  their	  own.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  people	  sync	  their	  issues	  stands	  to	  that	  of	  the	  
candidate	  they	  voted	  or	  intend	  to	  vote	  for.	  	  Therefore,	  vote	  choice	  alters	  voter's	  policy	  stands;	  the	  flow	  
of	  the	  funnel	  of	  causality	  is	  reversed.	  	  
As	  we	  know,	  knowledge	  is	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  voters	  to	  translate	  their	  values	  into	  specific	  policy	  
choices	  (Zaller	  1992;	  Delli	  Carpini	  and	  Keeter	  1996).	  	  However,	  there	  is	  barely	  any	  “enlightened	  prefer-­‐
ences”	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  campaign	  (Gelman	  and	  King	  1993).	  	  How	  do	  the	  widely	  politically	  ignorant	  
public	  shape	  their	  attitudes	  on	  political	  issues?	  	  	  Campaigns	  provide	  abundant	  political	  information.	  	  A	  
large	  number	  of	  undecided	  voters	  are	  learning	  through	  campaign	  process.	  	  News	  media	  helps	  voters	  
gradually	  shape	  clear	  issue	  position	  and	  candidate	  endorsement,	  by	  highlighting	  the	  perceived	  differ-­‐
ence	  between	  candidates	  (Alvarez	  1998;	  Bartels	  1993;	  Franklin	  1991;	  Popkin	  1991,	  2001).	  	  As	  Gelman	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and	  King	  (1993)	  put	  it,	  “the	  media	  make	  the	  campaign	  relatively	  fair	  by	  giving	  both	  candidates	  a	  reason-­‐
able	  opportunity	  to	  express	  their	  views,	  thus	  continuing	  to	  help	  inform	  the	  voters.”	  	  If	  voters	  think	  cer-­‐
tain	  candidate	  trustworthy,	  knowledgeable	  and	  intend	  vote	  for	  him,	  it	  is	  highly	  likely	  those	  voters	  will	  
align	  their	  policy	  attitudes	  with	  that	  of	  the	  candidate.	  	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  voters'	  policy	  posi-­‐
tions	  may	  gradually	  change	  when	  they	  are	  aware	  of	  where	  the	  candidate	  stands.	  
2. Attitudes	  Towards	  the	  Redistribution	  of	  Wealth	  
I	  choose	  to	  study	  tax	  policy	  because	  compared	  with	  moral	  issues,	  economic	  issues	  remain	  the	  
center	  in	  American	  politics,	  as	  its	  role	  in	  voting	  decision	  (Ansolabehere	  et	  al	  2006).	  	  In	  2008	  presidential	  
election,	  particularly,	  economic	  recovery	  is	  the	  general	  primary	  concern.	  	  Taxation	  and	  redistribution	  are	  
among	  the	  chief	  factors	  that	  determine	  how	  well	  American	  democracy	  works.	  	  
Following	  Hobbesian	  and	  Lockesian	  liberalism,	  Americans	  distrust	  government,	  value	  self-­‐
reliance	  and	  individual	  initiative.	  	  However,	  there	  are	  wide	  inattention	  and	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  tax	  
policies.	  	  The	  public	  failed	  to	  connect	  unfair	  taxation	  with	  the	  deteriorating	  social	  equality.	  	  People	  
would	  rather	  believe	  that	  the	  rich	  get	  richer	  and	  the	  poor	  get	  poorer,	  regardless	  of	  what	  the	  actual	  eco-­‐
nomic	  trends	  are.	  	  Yet,	  affluent	  people	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  knowledgeable,	  contact	  public	  officials	  and	  
turnout	  to	  vote	  than	  the	  poor	  to	  get	  their	  voice	  heard	  (see	  Bartels	  2008).	  	  Positions	  on	  tax	  policy	  are	  
largely	  determined	  by	  ideological	  values:	  liberals	  are	  more	  concerned	  than	  conservatives	  about	  increas-­‐
ing	  inequality,	  while	  conservatives	  blame	  inequality	  to	  lack	  of	  “hard	  work”.	  	  	  
Bartels	  (2005)	  attributes	  the	  wide	  support	  of	  George	  W.	  Bush	  tax	  cuts	  to	  the	  simple	  ignorance	  of	  
mass	  public	  and	  their	  lack	  of	  information.	  	  Bartels	  (2005,	  2008)	  shows	  that	  the	  public	  mistakenly	  voted	  
for	  the	  taxation	  that	  against	  their	  interests,	  which	  casting	  doubts	  on	  how	  democracy	  functions	  if	  voters	  
can't	  vote	  correctly	  for	  their	  own	  benefit.	  	  	  
“While	  public	  opinion	  was	  generally	  supportive	  of	  the	  Bush	  tax	  cuts,	  there	  is	  also	  plenty	  of	  evi-­‐
dence	  of	  ignorance	  and	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  tax	  system	  and	  the	  policy	  options	  under	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consideration-­‐or	  actually	  adopted-­‐in	  Washington.	  	  Much	  of	  the	  public	  was	  unclear	  about	  basic	  facts	  in	  
the	  realm	  of	  tax	  policy;	  some	  of	  what	  the	  public	  did	  know	  was	  patently	  false;	  and	  a	  remarkable	  number	  
of	  people,	  when	  offered	  the	  chance,	  said	  that	  they	  had	  not	  thought	  about	  a	  policy	  innovation	  whose	  
consequences	  are	  reckoned	  by	  experts	  in	  trillions	  of	  dollars.	  p.177”	  
We	  know	  that	  if	  better	  informed,	  individuals	  are	  remarkably	  more	  likely	  to	  see	  the	  policy	  indica-­‐
tions	  and	  make	  the	  correct	  voting	  choice	  (Basinger	  and	  Lavine	  2005).	  	  	  Studies	  find	  when	  getting	  more	  
informed,	  Republicans	  give	  more	  support	  for	  tax	  cut,	  while	  Democrats	  are	  dramatically	  less	  likely	  to	  en-­‐
dorse	  it	  (Bartels	  2008).	  	  Political	  experts	  and	  public	  opinion	  leaders	  are	  thought	  to	  be	  more	  knowledgea-­‐
ble	  than	  others	  (Fiske	  and	  Kinder	  1981).	  	  Without	  full	  information	  about	  taxation,	  people	  may	  have	  re-­‐
lied	  on	  cues	  from	  elites.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  why	  Americans	  choose	  their	  tax	  positions	  and	  
how	  presidential	  campaigns	  affect	  their	  evaluation.	  
3. Theory	  and	  Hypotheses	  of	  Attitude	  Change	  
My	  chief	  task	  is	  to	  test	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  2008	  campaign	  on	  tax	  policy	  positions.	  	  I	  propose	  two	  
reasons	  why	  voters	  will	  shift	  their	  positions:	  cognitive	  dissonance	  and	  elite	  persuasion.	  	  	  My	  first	  theo-­‐
ry	  is	  that	  voters	  seek	  to	  reduce	  cognitive	  dissonance	  by	  adopting	  their	  preferred	  candidate's	  issue	  posi-­‐
tions.	  	  A	  possible	  explanation	  for	  opinion	  change	  lies	  in	  that	  psychologically	  people	  do	  not	  want	  to	  be	  
different	  or	  out	  of	  step	  with	  the	  politician	  they	  like.	  	  Inconsistent	  attitudes	  cause	  psychological	  discom-­‐
fort.	  	  Voters	  think	  their	  candidates	  are	  capable	  of	  representing	  their	  interests	  and	  know	  better	  on	  public	  
policies.	  They	  change	  their	  initial	  opinion	  due	  to	  psychological	  pressures.	  Voters	  will	  move	  positions	  to	  
be	  closer	  to	  their	  candidate's,	  while	  alienating	  themselves	  with	  the	  rival	  candidate's	  position.	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  cognitive	  dissonance,	  elite	  persuasion	  can	  be	  powerful	  since	  the	  public	  has	  
demonstrated	  wide	  inattention	  and	  uncertainty	  about	  the	  tax	  policies.	  	  Campaigns,	  especially	  presiden-­‐
tial	  campaigns,	  provide	  much	  information	  in	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  political	  issues.	  	  The	  electorate	  may	  be	  
learning	  through	  campaigns,	  and	  become	  responsive	  to	  campaign	  messages.	  Therefore,	  taxation	  is	  one	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of	  the	  domains	  that	  campaign	  can	  effectively	  sway	  public	  opinions.	  	  	  For	  example,	  if	  one	  likes	  Obama,	  he	  
would	  like	  to	  listen	  to	  Obama's	  speech,	  support	  Obama's	  campaign,	  and	  align	  himself	  with	  Obama's	  pol-­‐
icy	  stands.	  	  According	  to	  Brody	  and	  Page	  (1972),	  if	  an	  individual	  alters	  his	  own	  issue	  stands	  to	  what	  he	  
thinks	  the	  favored	  candidate	  stands,	  then	  one	  is	  persuaded	  by	  the	  candidate.	  
Based	  on	  these	  theoretical	  explanations	  of	  opinion	  change	  during	  a	  campaign,	  I	  have	  two	  hy-­‐
potheses:	  
Hypothesis	  1:	  Attitudes	  towards	  taxation	  move	  in	  a	  more	  liberal	  direction	  during	  the	  campaign	  if	  
the	  respondent	  would	  have	  voted	  for	  Obama.	  
Hypothesis	  2:	  Attitudes	  towards	  taxation	  move	  in	  a	  more	  conservative	  direction	  during	  the	  
campaign	  if	  the	  respondent	  would	  have	  voted	  for	  McCain.	  
I	  also	  investigate	  two	  possible	  interactive	  relationships.	  	  First,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  impact	  is	  
greater	  on	  those	  who	  are	  less	  politically	  interested,	  and	  therefore	  have	  not	  thought	  as	  deeply	  about	  
taxation	  policy	  and	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  change.	  	  Second,	  it	  maybe	  that	  those	  who	  express	  a	  higher	  sense	  
of	  importance	  about	  taxation	  policy	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  change.	  
Hypothesis	  3:	  Attitudes	  towards	  taxation	  move	  in	  a	  more	  liberal	  direction	  during	  the	  campaign	  if	  
the	  respondent	  would	  have	  voted	  for	  Obama	  and	  they	  are	  less	  interested	  in	  politics.	  
Hypothesis	  4:	  Attitudes	  towards	  taxation	  move	  in	  a	  more	  conservative	  direction	  during	  the	  
campaign	  if	  the	  respondent	  would	  have	  voted	  for	  McCain	  and	  they	  are	  less	  interested	  in	  politics.	  
Hypothesis	  5:	  Attitudes	  towards	  taxation	  move	  in	  a	  more	  liberal	  direction	  during	  the	  campaign	  if	  
the	  respondent	  would	  have	  voted	  for	  Obama	  and	  taxation	  policy	  is	  less	  important.	  
Hypothesis	  6:	  Attitudes	  towards	  taxation	  move	  in	  a	  more	  conservative	  direction	  during	  the	  
campaign	  if	  the	  respondent	  would	  have	  voted	  for	  McCain	  and	  taxation	  policy	  is	  less	  important.	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4. Data	  
I	  use	  NES	  survey	  data	  from	  United	  States	  Presidential	  election	  year	  of	  2008	  to	  test	  my	  hypothesis.	  	  
The	  data,	  questionnaires,	  response	  rates,	  and	  detailed	  information	  on	  the	  survey	  methodology	  are	  
available	  at	  the	  NES	  website1.	  	  Table	  1	  contains	  the	  summary	  statistics	  for	  the	  pooled	  data.	  
Table	  1:	  Summary	  Statistics	  
Variable	   Mean	   SD	   Minimum	   Maximum	  
Wave	   5.6	   3.611	   1	   10	  
TV	  News	   4.870	   2.256	   0	   7	  
Radio	  News	   3.326	   2.555	   0	   7	  
Internet	  News	   3.283	   2.675	   0	   7	  
Print	  News	   3.393	   2.812	   0	   7	  
Issue	  Importance	   3.282	   1.22	   1	   5	  
Political	  Interest	   3.670	   1.007	   1	   5	  
Obama	  Favorability	   2.229	   .827	   1	   3	  
McCain	  Favorability	  	   2.217	   .787	   1	   3	  
Age	   50.782	   15.785	   18	   90	  
Gender	   .424	   .494	   0	   1	  
White	   .776	   .417	   0	   1	  
Education	   3.356	   1.090	   1	   5	  
Income	   12.225	   4.131	   1	   19	  
Partisanship	   3.865	   2.198	   1	   7	  
Vote	  Choice	  in	  2008	   .533	   .499	   0	   1	  
Opinion	  on	  taxation	  over	  
200,000	  
.997	   .873	   0	   2	  
	  
The	  dependent	  variable	  derives	  from	  the	  survey	  question	  on	  whether	  the	  respondents	  “favor	  or	  
oppose	  raising	  taxes	  on	  incomes	  over	  200k/yr”.	  	  (1)	  is	  coded	  as	  “oppose”,	  	  (2)	  “neither	  favor	  nor	  oppose”	  
and	  (3)	  ``favor".	  To	  examine	  how	  voters'	  policy	  beliefs	  change	  over	  time,	  the	  main	  independent	  variable	  
wave	  measures	  when	  the	  survey	  was	  taken:	  either	  January	  (wave	  1)	  coded	  (0)	  or	  October	  2008	  (wave	  10)	  
coded	  (1).	  The	  causal	  relationship	  can	  only	  be	  unidirectional	  as	  the	  time	  survey	  was	  taken	  cannot	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The	  NES	  is	  website	  is	  http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/cdf/cdf.htm	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caused	  by	  a	  change	  in	  policy	  beliefs,	  so	  it	  tests	  how	  the	  campaign	  changes	  the	  direction	  and	  magnitude	  
of	  voter's	  attitudes.	  	  Since	  voters'	  attitude	  change	  can	  never	  change	  time,	  it	  gets	  around	  the	  typical	  
problem	  of	  endogeneity.	  
For	  the	  control	  variables,	  mass	  media	  is	  a	  major	  source	  for	  voters	  to	  get	  informed	  on	  politics.	  	  	  
For	  example,	  the	  media	  can	  attract	  voters'	  attention	  on	  certain	  issue,	  and	  cause	  people	  attach	  more	  im-­‐
portance	  than	  it	  worths.	  	  The	  NES	  data	  has	  survey	  questions	  on	  how	  many	  days	  in	  a	  typical	  week	  the	  
respondent	  reads	  news	  in	  print	  newspaper,	  reads/watches	  news	  on	  Internet,	  listens	  to	  radio	  news	  and	  
watches	  TV	  news.	  The	  TV	  news,	  radio	  news,	  Internet	  news,	  and	  print	  news	  are	  dichotomous	  variables	  
coded	  (0)	  to	  (1),	  measured	  at	  January,	  September	  and	  October	  2008.	  	  Issue	  importance	  shows	  what	  
voters	  think	  the	  importance	  of	  taxation.	  	  To	  the	  question	  “how	  important	  this	  issue	  to	  you	  personally”,	  
the	  variable	  tax	  200k/yr	  importance	  is	  measured	  at	  January	  and	  October,	  coding	  from	  (1)	  “not	  important	  
at	  all”	  to	  (5)	  “extremely	  important”.	  	  Partisanship	  is	  coded	  for	  respondents	  identify	  themselves	  as	  (1)	  
strong	  Democrat,	  (2)	  not	  very	  strong	  Democrat,	  (3)	  Independent	  Democrat,	  (4)	  Independent,	  	  (5)	  Inde-­‐
pendent	  Republican,	  (6)	  not	  very	  strong	  Republican	  and	  (7)	  strong	  Republican.	  The	  partisanship	  is	  meas-­‐
ured	  at	  January,	  September	  and	  October	  2008.	  	  Candidate	  favorability	  responds	  to	  the	  question	  “Does	  R	  
like	  or	  dislike	  John	  McCain/Barack	  Obama”,	  ranging	  from	  (1)	  dislike,	  (2)	  neither	  like	  nor	  dislike,	  and	  (3)	  
like.	  	  It	  is	  measured	  at	  January,	  February,	  June,	  September	  and	  October.	  	  Political	  interest	  tests	  respond-­‐
ent's	  interest	  in	  information	  about	  government	  and	  politics,	  measured	  at	  January,	  February,	  September	  
and	  October	  2008.	  	  The	  answers	  are	  scaled	  from	  “not	  interested	  at	  all”	  to	  “extremely	  interested”.	  	  
I	  also	  control	  for	  the	  demographical	  factors.	  The	  variable	  age	  is	  the	  respondent's	  age	  by	  the	  election	  
day	  in	  2008.	  	  Gender	  is	  a	  dichotomous	  variable	  coded	  (1)	  as	  male,	  (0)	  as	  female.	  	  White	  is	  coded	  as	  (1)	  
white,	  (0)	  if	  otherwise.	  	  Education	  is	  respondent's	  educational	  attainment,	  coded	  (1)	  if	  the	  respondent	  
has	  “no	  high	  school	  diploma”,	  (2)	  “high	  school	  diploma”,	  (3)	  “some	  college,	  no	  bachelor's	  degree”,	  	  (4)	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“Bachelor's	  degree”,	  and	  (5)	  “graduate	  degree”.	  	  Income	  is	  a	  categorical	  variable	  that	  based	  on	  the	  re-­‐
spondent's	  total	  income	  of	  household	  in	  the	  past	  12	  months.	  
5. Methods	  
I	  use	  2008-­‐2009	  American	  National	  Election	  Survey	  (NES)	  monthly	  panel	  study	  to	  examine	  the	  
casual	  complexities	  of	  vote	  choice	  and	  policy	  stands.	  	  The	  survey	  was	  conducted	  in	  January	  (wave	  1),	  
February	  (wave	  2),	  June	  (wave	  6),	  September	  	  (wave	  9),	  October	  (wave	  10),	  and	  November	  (wave	  11)	  in	  
2008	  and	  other	  four	  waves	  in	  2009.	  	  In	  this	  research,	  I	  only	  utilize	  data	  from	  wave	  1	  to	  wave	  10	  in	  2008	  
(N=1092),	  which	  were	  the	  only	  waves	  that	  asked	  the	  tax	  policy	  question	  regarding	  the	  dependent	  varia-­‐
ble.	  	  
The	  data	  are	  longitudinal	  and	  the	  dependent	  variables	  of	  issue	  stands	  are	  coded	  as	  ordinal.	  	  The	  
panel	  has	  a	  large	  number	  of	  observances,	  while	  each	  individual	  may	  have	  a	  different	  curve	  on	  campaign	  
learning.	  	  	  Therefore,	  I	  use	  a	  random-­‐effects	  ordered	  probit	  model	  (Frechette	  2001).	  	  The	  previous	  re-­‐
search	  lack	  data	  of	  pre	  and	  post	  campaign	  data	  (see	  Lenz	  2009).	  This	  monthly	  NES	  panel	  data	  allows	  me	  
to	  track	  voters'	  policy	  change	  over	  time	  during	  the	  presidential	  campaign.	  	  The	  data	  are	  strongly	  bal-­‐
anced.	  
6. Results	  
In	  the	  2008	  presidential	  campaign,	  Barack	  Obama	  endorsed	  raising	  taxes	  on	  couples	  with	  in-­‐
come	  over	  250,000	  per	  year;	  John	  McCain	  proposed	  extending	  Bush	  tax	  cut	  policy.	  	  In	  Table	  2,	  Obama	  
voters	  demonstrate	  a	  positive	  trend	  in	  supporting	  higher	  taxation	  rates	  on	  the	  wealthy	  as	  the	  election	  
approaches.	  	  It	  shows	  from	  January	  to	  October	  2008,	  those	  who	  eventually	  voted	  for	  Obama	  are	  becom-­‐
ing	  more	  favorable	  of	  raising	  taxes	  on	  annual	  incomes	  over	  200,000.	  	  In	  contrast,	  McCain	  voters	  are	  be-­‐
coming	  more	  against	  of	  raising	  taxes	  upon	  incomes	  greater	  200,000	  per	  year.	  	  Using	  time	  as	  inde-­‐
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pendent	  variable	  gets	  around	  the	  problem	  of	  endogeneity.	  Thus,	  we	  can	  assume	  a	  meaningful	  causal	  
relationship	  with	  the	  variable	  wave	  in	  the	  two	  models.	  	  We	  see	  how	  voters'	  ideology	  dynamically	  moves	  
into	  two	  opposite	  directions.	  
Table	  2:	  Voters'	  Position	  on	  Raising	  Taxes	  Upon	  Incomes	  over	  200,000	  Per	  Year	  
Variable	   Obama	  Voters	   McCain	  Voters	  
Wave	   0.028*(.012)	   -­‐0.034**(.011)	  
TV	  News	   0.047(.029)	   0.063(.032)	  
Print	  News	   0.014	   (.023)	   -­‐0.024(.025)	  
Radio	  News	   -­‐0.020(.024)	   0.019(.026)	  
Internet	  News	   0.022(.023)	   -­‐0.008(.025)	  
Issue	  Importance	   0.40***(.054)	   -­‐0.168**	  (.054)	  
Political	  Interest	   0.01(.069)	   -­‐0.234***(.073)	  
Candidate	  Favorability	   0.270*(.110)	   0.076(.098)	  
Partisanship	   -­‐0.149***(.041)	   0.259***(.046)	  
Age	   0.006(.005)	   -­‐0.005(.005)	  
Gender	   0.214(.134)	   -­‐0.422**	  (.140)	  
White	   0.836***(.151)	   -­‐0.466(.288)	  
Education	   0.126(.067)	   -­‐0.249***(.075)	  
Income	   -­‐0.053**(.018)	   -­‐0.113***	  (.023)	  
τ1	   0.858(.454)	   -­‐6.526***(.737)	  
τ2	   1.939***(.467)	   -­‐5.318***(.688)	  
ρ	   0.495***(.0756)	   0.654***	  (.053)	  
N	   1174	   1092	  
	  
Note:	  Cells	  represent	  coefficients	  and	  standard	  errors	  of	  random	  effects	  probit	  panel	  regression	  models	  for	  the	  
determinants	  of	  attitude	  toward	  increasing	   taxation	  on	  individuals	  making	  greater	  $200,000	  per	  year.	  	  
Standard	  error	  in	  parentheses.	  	  
∗p<.05	  **p<.01	  ***p<.001	  	  
	  
Issue	  importance	  has	  a	  highly	  significant	  correlation	  with	  policy	  stands	  of	  taxation.	  Those	  who	  
attach	  more	  importance	  on	  tax	  raising	  are	  likely	  to	  strengthen	  their	  policy	  attitudes.	  	  Obama	  voters	  and	  
McCain	  voters	  have	  polarized	  views	  in	  raising	  tax.	  	  Partisanship	  shows	  Republicans	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  
oppose	  raising	  taxes	  than	  Democrats.	  	  It	  echoes	  with	  the	  previous	  scholarship	  that	  partisanship	  strongly	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affects	  policy	  preferences.	  	  	  As	  Bartels	  (2005)	  assert,	  policy	  stands	  on	  taxation	  are	  shaped	  by	  fundamen-­‐
tal	  political	  values	  such	  as	  party	  identification	  and	  ideology.	  	  Additionally,	  perceptions	  on	  personal	  tax	  
burden	  matter.	  	  Personal	  economic	  condition	  and	  interests	  largely	  correlate	  with	  issue	  stands.	  	  	  But	  con-­‐
trary	  to	  Bartels's	  claim	  that	  the	  publics	  are	  unable	  to	  grasp	  tax	  policy	  in	  their	  interests,	  the	  variable	  of	  
Income	  shows	  that	  voters	  with	  higher	  income	  are	  significantly	  less	  favorable	  of	  raising	  taxes.	  
The	  results	  support	  my	  hypothesis,	  that	  voters	  adjust	  their	  issue	  ideology	  towards	  that	  of	  their	  
preferred	  candidates.	  Downsian	  theory	  advocates	  voters	  are	  learning	  through	  the	  campaign	  and	  then	  
choose	  the	  candidate	  that	  best	  matched	  their	  preference.	  	  It	  echoes	  with	  previous	  scholarship	  that	  vote	  
choice	  explains	  later	  changes	  in	  issue	  attitudes	  (Finkel	  1995).	  Voters’	  ideologies	  are	  moving	  towards	  
their	  preferred	  candidates’.	  Through	  media	  exposure,	  the	  electorate	  are	  able	  to	  learn	  the	  issues	  and	  
gradually	  adopt	  their	  preferred	  voters’	  position	  (Lenz	  2009).	  
Next	  I	  examine	  whether	  campaigns	  and	  mass	  media	  produce	  a	  process	  of	  learning,	  especially	  for	  
people	  with	  less	  interest	  in	  politics	  and	  government.	  	  I	  show	  in	  Table	  3	  the	  same	  models	  as	  in	  Table	  2,	  




Table	  3:	  Interaction	  Between	  Political	  Interest	  and	  Wave	  
Variable	   Obama	  Voters	   McCain	  Voters	  
Political	  Interest	  *	  Wave	   -­‐.008(.012)	  	   .007(.012)	  
Wave	   .046(.031)	   -­‐.050(.031)	  
Political	  Interest	   .027(.091)	   .197*(.100)	  
TV	  News	   .046(.029)	   .063(.033)	  
Print	  News	   .015(.023)	   -­‐.023(.025)	  
Radio	  News	   -­‐.020(.024)	   -­‐.020(.026)	  
Internet	  News	   .022(.023)	   -­‐.009(.024)	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   Table	  3(continued)	   	  
Issue	  Importance	   -­‐.399***(.055)	   .166**(.054)	  
Candidate	  Favorability	   .274*(.110)	   .078(.098)	  
Partisanship	   -­‐.150***(.041)	   -­‐.260***(.046)	  
Age	   .006(.005)	   -­‐.005(.005)	  
Gender	   .216(.134)	   -­‐.426**(.141)	  
White	   .838***(.152)	   -­‐.465(.289)	  
Education	   .126(.067)	   -­‐.249***(.075)	  
Income	   -­‐.053**(.018)	   -­‐.114***(.023)	  
τ1	   -­‐1.504**(.577)	   -­‐4.223***(.763)	  
τ2	   -­‐.420(.570)	   -­‐3.012***(.726)	  
ρ	   .497***(.076)	   .655***(.052)	  
N	   1174	   1092	  	  
	  
Note:	  Cells	  represent	  coefficients	  and	  standard	  errors	  of	  random	  effects	  probit	  panel	  regression	  models	  for	  the	  
determinants	  of	  attitude	  toward	  increasing	  taxation	  on	  individuals	  making	  greater	  $200,000	  per	  year.	  
Standard	  error	  in	  parentheses.	  	  In	  this	  model,	  political	  interest	  is	  coded	  from	  (1)	  extremely	  interested	  to	  (5)	  
not	  interested	  at	  all.	  	  
∗p<.05	  **p<.01	  ***p<.001	  
It	  shows	  as	  people	  have	  less	  political	  interest,	  they	  are	  less	  susceptible	  to	  the	  campaign	  effects.	  	  
When	  it	  gets	  closer	  to	  the	  election	  day,	  Obama	  voters	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  support	  raising	  taxes,	  whereas	  
McCain	  votes	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  support.	  	  The	  relationship	  is	  not	  statistically	  significant,	  though.	  	  
Further,	  I	  examine	  whether	  campaigns	  and	  mass	  media	  produce	  a	  process	  of	  learning,	  especially	  
for	  people	  where	  taxation	  is	  an	  important	  issue.	  	  I	  show	  in	  Table	  3	  the	  same	  models	  as	  in	  Table	  2,	  but	  
with	  Wave	  interacted	  with	  Issue	  Importance.	  
Table	  4:	  Interaction	  Between	  Issue	  Importance	  and	  Wave	  
Variable	   Obama	  Voters	   McCain	  Voters	  
Importance	  *	  Wave	   .006(.010)	   .002(.010)	  
Wave	   .008(.033)	   -­‐.040(.032)	  
Issue	  Importance	   -­‐.432***(.074)	   .156*(.074)	  
TV	  News	   .047(.029)	   .063(.032)	  
Print	  News	   .014(.023)	   -­‐.024(.025)	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   Table	  4	  (continued)	   	  
Radio	  News	   -­‐.021(.024)	   -­‐.020(.026)	  
Internet	  News	   .023(.023)	   -­‐.008(.024)	  
Political	  Interest	   -­‐.010(.070)	   .234***(.074)	  
Candidate	  Favorability	   .273*(.110)	   .078(.098)	  
Partisanship	   -­‐.151***(.041)	   -­‐.259***(.046)	  
Age	   .006(.005)	   -­‐.005(.005)	  
Gender	   .212(.134)	   -­‐.422**(.140)	  
White	   .836***(.151)	   -­‐.469(.289)	  
Education	   .127(.067)	   -­‐.249***(.075)	  
Income	   -­‐.053**(.018)	   -­‐.113***(.023)	  
τ1	   -­‐1.684**(.571)	   -­‐4.149***(.750)	  
τ2	   -­‐.601(.562)	   -­‐2.940***(.713)	  
ρ	   .495***(.076)	   .654***(.053)	  
N	   1174	   1092	  
	  
Note:	  Cells	  represent	  coefficients	  and	  standard	  errors	  of	  random	  effects	  probit	  panel	  regression	  models	  for	  the	  
determinants	  of	  attitude	  toward	  increasing	  taxation	  on	  individuals	  making	  greater	  $200,000	  per	  year.	  	  
Standard	  error	  in	  parentheses.	  	  In	  this	  model,	  issue	  Importance	  is	  coded	  from	  (1)	  extremely	  important	  to	  (5)	  
not	  important	  at	  all.	  	  
∗p<.05	  **p<.01	  ***p<.001	  
The	  results	  indicate	  those	  who	  attach	  less	  importance	  to	  taxation	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  strengthen	  
support	  for	  raising	  taxes.	  	  The	  effect	  applies	  for	  both	  Obama	  voters	  and	  McCain	  voters.	  	  However,	  the	  
relationships	  do	  not	  have	  statistically	  significance.	  	  
7. Conclusion	  
The	  funnel	  voting-­‐decision	  making	  has	  been	  debated	  over	  sixty	  years.	  My	  findings	  improve	  our	  
understanding	  of	  the	  voting	  process.	  	  The	  process	  of	  voting	  does	  not	  simply	  follow	  the	  funnel	  mode.	  	  
Prior	  studies	  argue	  campaign	  information	  don't	  relate	  very	  much	  to	  voting	  choices	  (Berelson,	  Lazarsfeld,	  
McPhee	  1954;	  Campbell,	  Converse,	  Miller,	  and	  Stokes	  1960).	  	  	  On	  the	  contrary,	  I	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  
campaign	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  shaping	  voters'	  issue	  position.	  	  The	  campaign	  messages	  successfully	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clarify	  policies	  and	  candidate	  positions,	  and	  alleviate	  the	  general	  deficit	  of	  information	  (Vavreck	  2009).	  	  	  
In	  other	  words,	  the	  classical	  funnel	  sequence	  can	  fundamentally	  be	  reversed	  by	  campaign	  messages.	  	  
Campaigns	  facilitate	  civic	  education,	  but	  also	  influence	  the	  basic	  issue	  positions	  of	  the	  electorate.	  	  
Future	  research	  might	  explore	  more	  on	  how	  campaign	  messages	  impact	  on	  other	  policies,	  such	  as	  social	  
and	  cultural	  issues.	  	  It	  would	  be	  good	  to	  know	  whether	  there	  is	  any	  issue	  selection	  bias	  when	  voters	  as-­‐
similate	  to	  the	  candidate's	  issue	  stands.	  	  And	  what	  drives	  voters	  to	  choose	  their	  intended	  candidate	  first?	  	  
The	  variety	  of	  voter	  responsiveness	  on	  campaign	  messages	  should	  be	  explored	  more.	  	  It	  also	  indicates	  
that	  campaign	  strategies	  exert	  a	  profound	  influence	  on	  issue	  opinion.	  	  	  	  Further,	  this	  study	  implies	  that	  
political	  elites	  define	  public	  choice.	  	  Elite	  polarization	  help	  the	  public	  perceive	  important	  differences	  be-­‐
tween	  parties;	  and	  parties	  provide	  choices	  not	  echos	  (Key	  1966;	  Nie,	  Verba	  and	  Petrocik	  1979;	  Page	  
1978).	  	  Those	  who	  are	  more	  exposed	  and	  responsive	  to	  new	  information	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  affected	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